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A Signaling-based Incentive Mechanism for
Device-to-Device Content Sharing
in Cellular Networks
Tao Zhang, Haibo Wang, Xiaoli Chu, and Jianzhang He
Abstract—In this letter, we model the Device-to-device (D2D)
content sharing problem as a labor market where the base station
(BS) acts as the principal and content providers serve as agents.
A signaling-based content-sharing incentive (SCSI) mechanism is
designed to encourage candidate content providers to participate
in content sharing, and the optimal strategy for each content
provider is derived to maximize their utility (monetary profit)
while guaranteeing a non-negative utility for the BS. Simulation
results show that the proposed SCSI mechanism can increase the
content provider’s utility and participating enthusiasm in D2D
content sharing.
Index Terms—content sharing, device-to-device communica-
tions, signaling, incentive mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
THE global mobile data traffic has been predicted toincrease nearly eightfold between 2015 and 2020 [1].
The proliferation of intelligent mobile devices running multi-
media applications such as content sharing, social networking
and online gaming brings a huge challenge to future wire-
less networks. Evolving from end-to-end communications to
content-centric wireless networking has become an inevitable
trend. Traditional cellular communications urgently need new
technologies and methods to tackle the challenge [2]–[3].
Device-to-device (D2D) communications have been consid-
ered as a promising approach to improve spectrum and power
efficiency [4]-[5] and offload traffic from cellular networks.
For example, some UEs which have downloaded frequently
requested content can store and share these content to other
UEs via D2D links and avoid repeatedly downloading from
the BS [6]. In this case, the BS’s traffic load will be greatly
reduced, and the cellular network capacity can be utilized more
efficiently.
To promote D2D content sharing, the first problem is to
motivate UEs to share with others using their own energy
resource, e.g., the BS can offer a reward to compensate the
content provider’s cost to provide incentive [7]-[8]. Ideally the
BS should select the UE with the best transmission capacity
toward the content requester UE, and give reward according to
its capacity. However, the content provider UEs may compete
This research was supported partly through the National Natural Science
Foundation of China [No.61471026], and in part through the Fundamental
Research Funds for the Central Universities [No.2016JBZ003].
T. Zhang, H. Wang and J. He are with the School of Electronics and
Information, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China (e-mail:
14120175, hbwang, 14120068@bjtu.edu.cn).
X. Chu is with the Department of Electronic and Electrical Engineering,
University of Sheffield, Sheffield S1 3JD, UK (e-mail: x.chu@sheffield.ac.uk).
for the reward by claiming higher capacity than its true value,
which is a type of Information Asymmetry [9]. It is our goal
to design an effective incentive mechanism and solve the
information asymmetry for D2D content sharing.
Contract theory is a powerful model to analyze incentive
problem with information asymmetry from economics [10],
and has been adopted in some contemporary research work
[11]-[12]. In the contract-theoretical model, the BS play as
the principal, who outsources the data transmission work to
some content provider UEs near the content requester UE.
The content provider UEs serve as the agent, who compete for
the content sharing work and get corresponding reward from
the principal. Nazari and Jamalipour adopted the contract and
auction theory to design a forwarding incentive mechanism
for multi–relay cooperative wireless networks [11]. Zhang et
al. [12] proposed a contract-based incentive mechanism for
content dissemination in D2D cooperative communications.
The incentive mechanisms in [11]-[12] employs the screening
mechanism from contract theory to solve the Information
Asymmetry problem - the transmission ability of the agents
toward the content requester are naturally known to them-
selves, but not known to the principal. In screening model, the
principal (i.e., the BS) offers a menu of contracts to the agents
to separate different types of agents, and the agents’ choices
reveals their types (transmission abilities). In this process, the
agents are passive, and if the BS can not estimate the agents’
capacity accurately, the contract will not be fair to all the
agents and may reduce the participating enthusiasm of some
agents. we formulate the D2D content sharing problem based
on the Principal-Agent model and use the signaling method to
solve the associated Information Asymmetry problem while
the previous work [4] uses screening-based method to solve.
In this letter, we formulate the D2D content sharing incen-
tive problem based on the Principal-Agent model, which is in
the contract theory framework. The main contributions can be
summarized as follows. First, we use the signaling method to
solve the Information Asymmetry problem in the Principal-
Agent model while the previous work is screening-based
method [12]. Compared to the screening based method, higher
accuracy of the agent types or capabilities will be known
by the principal. Second, we tackle the deceit problem in
contract signing by designing the signal sent from a candidate
content provider to the BS as a guarantee, which includes
the guaranteed compensation information if the D2D content
sharing fails. We calculate the optimal guarantee and maximize
the utility of the content provider while a non-negative utility
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is ensured for the BS. Performance of the proposed SCSI
mechanism is compared with two existing agent selection and
incentive schemes. Simulation results show that the proposed
SCSI mechanism can much more effectively motivate the UE
participation in D2D content sharing.
The rest of the letter is organized as follows. Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, the SCSI mechanism
is proposed. Simulation results are presented and analyzed in
Section IV. Section V concludes this work.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a single-cell cellular network where there
are one BS in the center, a number of cellular UEs, one
content requester (CR) UE far from the BS, and N potential
content provider (CP ) UEs (i.e., CP1, CP2, . . . , CPN ) ran-
domly distributed around the CR within the maximum D2D
communication range dmax, as shown in Fig. 1. Assume that
all the D2D transmitters use the same transmission power PD
and the UE position is semi-static within the D2D session,
since several mega-bytes can be transmitted within 1 second
in LTE. The channel model consists of path-loss and Rayleigh
Fig. 1. The System Model
fading. The received power Pr at the CR from the CPn can
be expressed as PDdn
−αhn, where hn stands for the Rayleigh
fading power gain and follows a unit-mean exponential distri-
bution, dn is the distance between the CR and the CPn, and
α is the path loss exponent.
We consider the D2D overlay model, i.e., D2D communica-
tions are assigned with dedicated radio resources and there is
no interference between D2D and conventional cellular links.
Then the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of CR from
CPn can be expressed as:
γn =
PDdn
−αhn
n0B
, (1)
where n0 is the power spectral density of the additive white
Gaussian noise (AWGN), and B is the channel bandwidth,
which is assumed to be the same for all D2D links. It is
easy to show that γn follows an exponential distribution with
E[γn] =
PDdn
−α
n0B
. Given γth as the SNR threshold , the outage
probability of the nth D2D link (i.e., the link between the CR
and the CPn) can be calculated as:
Poutn =
∫ γth
0
n0B
PDdn
−α
exp(−
σ2n0B
PDdn
−α
x)dx
=1− exp(
γthn0B
PDdn
−α
).
(2)
The data rate of the nth D2D link is given as:
Rn =B log2(1 + γn)
=B log
2
(1 +
PDdn
−αhn
n0B
).
(3)
When the CR UE requests contents (e.g., video clips, news
or music) from the BS, the BS can either provide the requested
content directly through the cellular downlink, or select a CP
UE to deliver the content via a D2D link. Since the candidate
CP UEs have no obligation to help the CR UE, the BS should
provide the selected CP UE with some reward, e.g., in money,
once the D2D content sharing is successfully completed. In
this case, the BS acts as a principle and the selected CP UE
serves as an agent as in the contract theory [10]. Due to the
space limit, we assume that there are two types of CP UE:
high type (θH ) and low type (θL) while the case more than
two types will be considered in our future work.
Definition 1. The type θn of CPn is proportional to the
channel gain gn between CPn and the CR UE, i.e.,
θn ∝ gn = dn
−α
hn. (4)
A threshold g0, which is designed by the BS, is used to
decide a CP ’s type (CP ’s type is known among the CP s), i.e.,
θn = θH if gn ≤ g0, otherwise θn = θL. A θH -type CP UE
is likely to offer a higher data rate on the D2D link to the CR
UE than a θL-type CP using the same transmit power. Similar
to the Information Asymmetry problem in microeconomics
[9], the BS may not know the exact type of each CP . We
assume that the BS knows that the portions of high-type CP
UEs and low-type CP UEs are ρ and 1 − ρ (0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1),
respectively. Assuming that the CPn is selected, we define
the utility function of the BS as follows:
UBS = µBRn −Wn, (5)
where Rn is the data rate of the D2D content sharing link
as given in (3), and Wn is the monetary reward given to the
selected CP UE, Wn = WH if θn = θH , otherwise Wn =
WL, usually WH > WL, and µB is the per-packet gain of
the BS measured in monetary units [10]. For simplicity, we
assume µB = 1 and the reservation utility level is no less than
zero [10].
The utility of the CPn is defined as:
UCPn = Wn −
1
2
cP
2
D, (6)
where c is the monetary cost for the CP UE to transmit a
packet to the CR UE with transmit power PD.
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III. SIGNALING-BASED CONTENT-SHARING INCENTIVE
MECHANISM FOR D2D CONTENT SHARING
A. Signaling
The signaling, also called signaling game, was first proposed
to analyze the job market [13], in which the education level
is considered as a trustworthy signal sent by the potential
employee since it takes intelligence and years of efforts to
acquire. In microeconomics [9], signaling is used to solve
the problem of Asymmetric Information, where the principal
cannot directly observe the abilities of the agents, and the
agents send signals to the principal to expose their abilities.
The principal will offer a higher reward to a high-type agent
than to a low-type agent, and offer a higher reward to an
agent who sends a signal than to one who does not. Sending a
signal should be costly to an agent, otherwise low-type agents
may send signals to pretend to be high-type agents in order
to obtain a higher reward than they actually deserve. The risk
of hiring a low-type agent can thus be reduced.
A successful signaling game will lead to a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium [10], which includes the Separating and Pooling
Equilibria. In the former, different types of agents send differ-
ent signals. In the latter, the same signal is sent by all agents.
In our proposed SCSI mechanism, if no signal is received
from CP UEs, i.e., in the pooling status, the BS would pay
the expected reward, ρWH + (1− ρ)WL, to the selected CP
[9]. Since the expected reward is lower than WH and higher
than WL, a high–type CP UE would like to reveal its type to
the BS more than a low-type one given the cost of sending a
signal.
B. Signal Design
We design the signal sent by a CP UE to the BS as
a guarantee, which promises a certain amount of monetary
compensation for the BS if the D2D content sharing fails.
Let O¯H and O¯L denote the average communication failure
probability of θH -type CP and θL-type CP UE, respectively,
which can be calculated by (2); x and y denote the guarantee
(i.e., the amount of money) promised by θH -type and θL-type
CP UE in the guarantee signal, respectively. Since sending the
signal (guarantee) requires additional cost, the utility function
of the CPn is modified to:
UCPn = Wn −
1
2
cP
2
D − Vn. (7)
where Vn = O¯Hx (O¯Ly) is the guaranteed amount of
compensation if CPn is a high-type (low-type) CP UE.
In order to form the Separating Equilibrium, according
to [10] and [9], two constraints must be satisfied: Incentive
Compatible(IC) and Individual Rationality(IR).
Definition 2. IC: CP s must prefer the guarantee designed
specifically for their own types and , i.e.,
WL −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Ly ≥WH −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Lx, (8)
WH −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Hx ≥WL −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Hy, (9)
where O¯Hy (O¯Lx) is the guaranteed compensation of a high-
type (low-type) CP UE if it pretends to be a low-type (high-
type) CP .
Definition 3. IR: The utility of a high-type CP UE after
sending signal is no less than the former, i.e.,
WH −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Hx ≥ (ρWH + (1− ρ)WL)−
1
2
cP
2
D. (10)
Note that low-type CP UEs will not send signals [9], and
thus y = 0. Based on (8), (9) and (10), the value of x is
bounded by:
(1− ρ)(WH −WL)
O¯H
≥ x ≥
WH −WL
O¯L
. (11)
C. Optimal Solution
We maximize the utility function of the selected high-type
CP UE, and the optimization problem can be written as :
x
∗ = argmax
x
(WH −
1
2
cP
2
D − O¯Hx), (12)
s.t.
(1−ρ)(WH−WL)
O¯H
≥ x ≥ WH−WL
O¯L
.
This is a linear problem. The optimal x∗ is found as:
x
∗ =
WH −WL
O¯L
. (13)
Thus, the maximum utility of the high-type CP is:
UˆCP = WH −
1
2
cP 2D − O¯H
WH −WL
O¯L
. (14)
In practice, x might be higher than x∗ and the selected
CP ’s utility may be lower than UˆCP , since the CP UEs may
increase the guarantee to win the competition. For example,
among the high-type CP UEs, the ones with higher residual
battery levels may send stronger signals than those with lower
residual battery levels to increase the probability of being
selected as the content provider. The detailed competition
analysis is beyond the scope of this letter.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
We evaluate the performance of the proposed SCSI mech-
anism in comparison with two existing agent selection ap-
proaches. The first one is Random Selection (RS), in which
the BS randomly selects a CP from the responding CP UEs.
The second one is No Information Asymmetry (NIA) [10], in
which the BS knows the exact type information of all the CP
UEs without any Information Asymmetry. In the simulations,
the high reward WH is set as 0.4 while the low reward WL
has two different values: WL1 = 0.1 and WL2 = 0.2.
A. Utility of CP UE
The utility of CP UE versus ρ is shown in Fig. 2. In NIA,
the CP utility is always zero since the CP ’s type is known
by the BS and there is no need of a signaling game. No matter
WL is WL1 or WL2, the CP utilities of both SCSI and RS
increase with ρ (the percentage of θH -type CP UEs), but the
utility of the former is larger than the latter. The two utilities
become the same when ρ approaches 0 or 1. In RS, the BS
does not know the types of CP UEs, and thus only wants to
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Fig. 2. Utility of CP vs. ρ
pay the expected reward to the selected CP UE if the D2D
content sharing succeeds. We can see that WL1 leads to a
lower CP utility than WL2 because it offers a lower expected
reward. When ρ is zero, there is no high type CP , both the
expected reward in RS and the reward in SCSI are WL, so the
two utilities will be the same. In SCSI, when ρ approaches
1, there are more high-type CP UEs and the expected reward
becomes very close toWH . This leads to a reduced a desire of
high-type CP UE to compete the high reward through sending
signal. Therefore, when ρ approaches 1, signaling stops and
the CP utilities of SCSI and RS will become the same again.
Although the CP utility of SCSI is lower for WL1 than for
WL2 , the utility gain of SCSI over RS is higher for WL1 as
compared with that for WL2.
B. Guarantee
The upper and lower bounds of x calculated in (11) are
plotted versus ρ in Fig. 3. We can see that WL1 results in
larger values of upper and lower bounds of x as compared with
WL2. Since the lower WL causes a lower expected reward in
the pooling status, and θH -type CP UEs are more eager to
be selected by increasing the guarantee value. The minimum
value of x (xmin) maintains constant while the maximum
value (xmax) decreases with ρ for both WL1 and WL2. This
is because xmin is the lowest cost for a high-type CP UE to
distinguish itself from the low-type CP UEs and could not be
reduced any further. When ρ increases, there are more high-
type CP UEs, the expected reward increases, and the desire
of individual θH -type CP UEs to be distinguished from θH -
type ones reduces, so xmax decreases. When xmax is equal
to xmin, the θH -type CP UEs will stop sending signals and
the guarantee goes down to 0.
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we adopt the signaling from microeconomics
to design an incentive mechanism for D2D content-sharing in
cellular networks. We propose a SCSI mechanism to motivate
UEs to participate in D2D content sharing, and calculate
the optimal signal (guarantee) for each CP UE to achieve
Separating Equilibrium. Simulation results show that the SCSI
mechanism can increase the the CP UE’s utility and that
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Fig. 3. Guarantee vs. ρ
the guarantee shall be adjusted according to the percentage
of high type content providers and BS offered reward values.
The signaling overhead and time delay of the SCSI will be
studied in our future work.
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